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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 This case requires us to interpret the phrase "corruptly 
persuades" in the federal witness tampering statute. That 
statute makes it a crime to attempt to "corruptly persuade" 
someone in order to "hinder, delay, or prevent the 
communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the 
United States of information relating to the commission or 
possible commission of a Federal offense." 18 U.S.C. 
S 1512(b)(3). William Farrell was convicted under the 
statute for attempting to dissuade a coconspirator from 
providing information to investigators of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) about Farrell's 
involvement in a conspiracy to commit the federal offense of 
selling adulterated meat. Farrell appeals his conviction on 
the ground that the conduct for which he was convicted did 
not constitute "corrupt persuasion" within the meaning of 
the statute. We agree and accordingly will reverse Farrell's 
conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent 




Before his arrest, Farrell drove a truck for a meat 
rendering plant. His job required him to pick up scraps and 
sweepings from various meat markets and deliver them to 
his employer's meat rendering facility for conversion into 
non-food products. Beginning in June 1991, Farrell began 
removing 10- to 25-pound bottom rounds from the cans of 
scrap and waste he had retrieved and selling the meat to 
the Bachetti Brothers Meat Market for 50c per pound. 
Bachetti Brothers would then grind up the meat and sell it 
to the public as hamburger. 
 




On February 13, 1992, USDA investigators videotaped 
Farrell carrying a barrel of meat from the back of his truck 
into the Bachetti Brothers Market. A few days later, USDA 
Agent James Zacher confronted Farrell and showed him the 
videotape. Agent Zacher asked Farrell if he would cooperate 
with a USDA investigation into Bachetti Brothers by 
wearing a body wire, but Farrell denied any wrongdoing 
and refused to cooperate. Agent Zacher then went to 
Bachetti Brothers and showed the videotape to Louis 
Bachetti, the market's manager, and his mother, Rose, who 
owned the market. Within a week, the Bachetti family had 
decided to cooperate with the investigation. In exchange for 
their cooperation, the USDA did not charge anyone who 
owned or worked at Bachetti Brothers with a crime.1 
 
After Agent Zacher showed him the videotape, Farrell 
spoke with Louis Bachetti about the USDA investigation on 
six occasions. On February 19, 1992, Farrell called 
Bachetti and told him about the videotape, but insisted 
that he did not know what the agents were talking about. 
Later that day, Farrell called Bachetti a second time and 
asked him if he had seen the tape and what he had told the 
agents. Bachetti told Farrell that he had told the agents 
nothing. Less than a week later, Farrell went to Bachetti 
Brothers and told Bachetti that they would be okay if they 
"stuck together." Shortly thereafter, Bachetti called Farrell 
and told him that he was going to cooperate with the 
USDA, but Farrell denied knowing what Bachetti was 
talking about. A few days later, Farrell called Bachetti and 
told him that he was going to admit to the USDA agents 
that he was bringing meat into Bachetti Brothers, but he 
was going to say that he was keeping the meat for his dogs. 
Farrell suggested that he and Bachetti "stick together" on 
the story about the meat being for Farrell's dogs. Finally, in 
early March 1992, Farrell approached Bachetti in the 
Bachetti Brothers parking lot and told him that he planned 
to stick to the story about the meat being for his dogs, and 
that he wanted Bachetti to do the same. Farrell then said 
to Bachetti, "If you crucify me, I'll have to turn around and 
crucify you." Bachetti and the district court interpreted this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Bachetti Brothers corporation was indicted and pleaded guilty to 
selling adulterated meat and will be subject to a fine. 
 




statement to mean that if Bachetti cooperated with the 
USDA and told the agents about Farrell's involvement in 
selling adulterated meat, Farrell would tell the agents what 
he knew about Bachetti's illegal activities. 
 
Farrell was indicted on one count of selling adulterated 
meat on August 24, 1995 and was arrested a few weeks 
later. After Farrell filed pretrial motions, a superseding 
indictment was returned adding a count of tampering with 
a witness. A second superseding indictment, returned on 
January 16, 1996, charged Farrell with conspiracy to sell 
adulterated meat, sale of adulterated meat, and tampering 
with a witness. On June 24, 1996, Farrell pleaded guilty to 
the adulterated meat counts, but chose to go forward with 
a bench trial on the witness tampering count. 
 
The witness tampering count alleged that Farrell had 
violated 18 U.S.C. S 1512(b)(3) by using intimidation and 
attempting corruptly to persuade Louis Bachetti to withhold 
information from or provide false information to agents of 
the USDA with the intent to hinder, delay or prevent 
communication by Bachetti to USDA agents of information 
relating to the commission or possible commission of a 
federal offense, the sale of adulterated meat. After the 
bench trial, the district court "conclude[d] that under the 
evidence, Mr. Farrell did attempt to persuade Louis 
Bachetti to withhold information, with the requisite intent 
to [delay], hinder, o[r] prevent communication by Bachetti 
to a Federal law officer." App. at 98. The court further 
found that "what was meant [by Farrell's `I'll have to crucify 
you' comment] was that if you tell the Government, I'll tell 
the Government what I know about you." App. at 100. The 
district court entered a verdict of guilty on the witness 
tampering count and filed a Bench Trial Memorandum. The 
Memorandum included findings that (1) Farrell "did not 
knowingly use intimidation" to try to prevent Bachetti's 
communication with USDA agents and (2) Farrell "did 
attempt corruptly to persuade Louis Bachetti to withhold 
information from agents of the [USDA] with the intent to 
hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information 
relating to the commission or possible commission of a 
Federal offense." Bench Trial Memo. at 1 (emphasis added). 
The court sentenced Farrell to 12 months and 1 day of 
imprisonment and a $3,000 fine. 
 




Farrell appeals his conviction on the witness tampering 
charge. He does not dispute the district court's factual 
findings, but contends that those findings and the 
supporting evidence do not establish that he committed the 
crime of witness tampering through "corrupt persuasion" 
because the "corruptly persuades" clause of the witness 
tampering statute does not apply to an attempt to persuade 
a coconspirator not to disclose information about the 




The federal witness tampering statute makes it unlawful 
for any person to: 
 
       knowingly use[ ] intimidation or physical force, 
       threaten[ ], or corruptly persuade[ ] another person, or 
       attempt[ ] to do so, or engage[ ] in misleading conduct 
       toward another person, with intent to-- 
 
       * * * 
 
        (3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a 
       law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of 
       information relating to the commission or possible 
       commission of a Federal offense ... 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1512(b)(3). The statute does not define 
"corruptly persuades," but does explain that "the term 
`corruptly persuades' does not include conduct which would 
be misleading conduct but for a lack of a state of mind." 18 
U.S.C. S 1515(a)(6). This explanation is irrelevant here, 
however, because Farrell does not dispute that he 
possessed the requisite intent to prevent Bachetti from 
communicating with the USDA investigators and the 
government does not contend that Farrell engaged in any 
"misleading conduct" with respect to Bachetti. 
 
Without any definitional assistance, we find the phrase 
"corruptly persuades" to be ambiguous. We agree with 
Farrell that the phrase cannot mean simply "persuades 
with the intent to hinder communication to law 
enforcement" because such an interpretation would render 
the word "corruptly" meaningless. The Supreme Court has 
cautioned that courts should give meaning to all statutory 
 




terms, especially those that "describe an element of a 
criminal offense." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 
141 (1994) (holding that "willfully," in the context of a 
statute criminalizing the "willful" violation of the prohibition 
on structuring cash transactions to avoid bank reporting 
laws, must be read as imposing an additional element of 
intent, i.e., knowledge of the unlawfulness of such 
structuring (as opposed to just knowledge of the reporting 
laws and intent to avoid them)). However, what meaning 
should be attributed to the word "corruptly" is not apparent 
from the face of the statute.2 
 
Nor does the legislative history provide us with much 
assistance in construing "corruptly" to determine what 
conduct Congress intended the "corruptly persuades" 
clause to proscribe. In a Report discussing the amendment 
adding the "corruptly persuades" clause to the witness 
tampering statute, the House Judiciary Committee noted 
that original S 1512(b) did not criminalize "noncoercive 
conduct that does not fall within the definition of 
`misleading conduct,' " and explained that the addition of 
the "corruptly persuades" clause "amend[ed] 18 U.S.C. 
S 1512(b) to proscribe `corrupt persuasion.' It is intended 
that culpable conduct that is not coercive or `misleading 
conduct' be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. S 1512(b)." H.R. 
Rep. No. 100-169, at 12 (1987). No explanation of what is 
meant by "culpable conduct" is provided. The Report does 
cite, as an example of "culpable corrupt persuasion" that 
would be punishable under amended S 1512(b), a case 
involving a defendant who both offered to rewardfinancially 
a coconspirator's silence and attempted to persuade the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The word "corruptly" has several different meanings. Its root, the 
adjective "corrupt," is defined as "morally degenerate and perverted" and 
"characterized by improper conduct (as bribery or the selling of favors)." 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 294 (1985). The verb "corrupt" 
has both transitive, as "to change [someone] from good to bad in morals, 
manners, or actions; ... bribe," and intransitive, as "to become [oneself] 
morally debased," meanings. Id. at 293. Given these definitions, 
"corruptly" in S 1512(b) may modify "persuades" to require persuasion 
through some corrupt means, persuasion of someone to engage in some 
corrupt conduct, and/or persuasion characterized by some "morally 
debased" purpose. 
 




coconspirator to lie to law enforcement officials about the 
defendant's involvement in the conspiracy. See id. at 12 & 
n.25 (citing United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 236-37 (2d 
Cir. 1985)). One court, apparently relying on this citation, 
has opined that Congress intended the amendment to 
expand S 1512(b) "to encompass cases where the defendant 
`corruptly persuades' the witness to testify falsely." United 
States v. Kulczyk, 931 F.2d 542, 546 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991). 
We think, however, that the better interpretation of the 
Report's citation to King is that Congress viewed both types 
of persuasion in which the King defendant engaged as 
sufficiently "culpable" or "corrupt" to fall within the 
proscription of S 1512(b). 
 
Thus, we are confident that both attempting to bribe 
someone to withhold information and attempting to 
persuade someone to provide false information to federal 
investigators constitute "corrupt persuasion" punishable 
under S 1512(b). Nonetheless, we are hesitant to define in 
more abstract terms the boundaries of the conduct 
punishable under the somewhat ambiguous "corruptly 
persuades" clause. However, we do not think it necessary to 
provide such a definition here because we are similarly 
confident that the "culpable conduct" that violates 
S 1512(b)(3)'s "corruptly persuades" clause does not include 
a noncoercive attempt to persuade a coconspirator who 
enjoys a Fifth Amendment right not to disclose self- 
incriminating information about the conspiracy to refrain, 
in accordance with that right, from volunteering 
information to investigators. 
 
We recognize that the prototypical situation in which an 
individual may attempt to persuade a coconspirator to 
exercise his Fifth Amendment right, i.e., that in which an 
attorney advises a client not to reveal information about his 
participation in a conspiracy to law enforcement officials, is 
expressly excluded from the reach of the statute. See 18 
U.S.C. S 1515(c) ("This chapter does not prohibit or punish 
the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation 
services in connection with or anticipation of an official 
proceeding."). However, we do not think that the attorney- 
client situation constitutes the only type of noncoercive 
persuasion to withhold information that falls outside the 
purview of S 1512(b)(3). 
 




A participant in a conspiracy clearly has a right under 
the Fifth Amendment not to provide law enforcement 
officials with information about the conspiracy that will 
incriminate him. See, e.g., United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 
1452, 1464 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Grand Jury (Markowitz), 
603 F.2d 469, 473-74 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973). Here, where 
the conspiracy arose from a bilateral commercial 
relationship in which Farrell sold and Bachetti bought 
adulterated meat, a disclosure by Bachetti of Farrell's 
conduct in connection with the conspiracy would 
necessarily implicate Bachetti as a participant in the 
conspiracy as well. Thus, Bachetti had a Fifth Amendment 
right not to disclose information to USDA investigators 
about his or Farrell's conduct in connection with the 
adulterated meat. The evidence indicates--and the district 
court found--that Farrell attempted to persuade Bachetti to 
exercise that right by refraining from revealing information 
about the adulterated meat transactions to the 
investigators. The district court expressly found that Farrell 
did not employ coercive methods in his efforts to dissuade 
Bachetti from cooperating with the USDA. Likewise there 
was no evidence that Farrell engaged in "corrupt" methods 
such as bribery. 
 
We read the inclusion of "corruptly" in S 1512(b) as 
necessarily implying that an individual can "persuade" 
another not to disclose information to a law enforcement 
official with the intent of hindering an investigation without 
violating the statute, i.e., without doing so "corruptly." 
Thus, more culpability is required for a statutory violation 
than that involved in the act of attempting to discourage 
disclosure in order to hinder an investigation. Because we 
find no basis in the district court's findings on which to 
conclude that more culpability existed here,3 we believe that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In the absence of a privilege, society has the right to the information 
of citizens regarding the commission of crime, and it can be argued that 
discouraging another who possessed no privilege from honoring this civic 
duty involves some culpability not present when coconspirators with 
Fifth Amendment privileges converse. For this reason, we express no 
opinion on the applicability of S 1512(b)(3) to efforts to dissuade 
someone 
who is not a participant in a conspiracy, and accordingly has no Fifth 
 




under the most plausible reading of S 1512(b), the conduct 
in which Farrell was found to have engaged did not 
constitute "corrupt persuasion." Even if we did not find this 
the most reasonable reading, however, we would 
nevertheless find that it is a permissible one and that the 
rule of lenity requires its adoption in this case. See United 
States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 901 (3d Cir. 1994)("The rule 
of lenity `demands resolution of ambiguities in criminal 
statutes in favor of the defendant.' ")(quoting Hughey v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990)); United States v. 
Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 1992)("Under th[e] rule [of 
lenity], when ambiguity in a criminal statute cannot be 
clarified by either its legislative history or inferences drawn 
from the overall statutory scheme, the ambiguity is resolved 
in favor of the defendant."). 
 
The government asks us to rely on cases construing the 
term "corruptly" in the context of the statute prohibiting the 
obstruction of justice generally, see 18 U.S.C. SS 1503,4 to 
hold that the "corruptly persuades" clause proscribes all 
persuasion that is "motivated by an improper purpose."5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Amendment right, not to reveal information about the conspiracy to 
federal law enforcement officials. Our opinion addresses only the 
situation in which the subject of a federal investigation attempts to 
persuade one who has also participated in the conduct under 
investigation not to disclose information about that conduct to federal 
investigators. 
 
4. Section 1503(a) provides: 
 
       Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening 
       letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or 
       impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of 
the 
       United States, ... or corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any 
       threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or 
       impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due 
       administration or justice, shall be punished .... 
 
5. The government contends that Farrell's "improper purpose" here was 
the prevention of Bachetti's communication of information about the 
conspiracy to sell adulterated meat to USDA investigators. As we have 
already discussed, however, such a purpose is already an element of the 
crime with which Farrell was charged and Congress's inclusion of the 
word corruptly in S 1512(b)(3) dictates that more than such a purpose is 
required. 
 




Appellee's Br. at 14-15. The government cites United States 
v. Thompson, in which the appellant argued thatS 1512(b) 
was unconstitutionally vague. 76 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1996). 
The Thompson court rejected the appellant's challenge, 
relying on cases construing "corruptly" in S 1503 to mean 
"motivated by an improper purpose" in order to give 
meaning to "corruptly persuades" in S 1512(b). Id. at 452. 
We decline to follow the Thompson approach because we do 
not find the use of "corruptly" in S 1503 sufficiently 
analogous to its use in S 1512(b)'s "corruptly persuades" 
clause to justify construing the terms identically. As the 
government recognizes, apparently without appreciating its 
significance, "corruptly" has consistently been interpreted 
to provide the intent element of the general obstruction of 
justice offense defined in S 1503. See , e.g., United States v. 
Barfield, 999 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Bashaw, 982 F.2d 168, 170 (6th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1979). 
This interpretation of "corruptly" in S 1503 is entirely 
appropriate given the structure of that statute, which 
broadly prohibits "corruptly ... influenc[ing], obstruct[ing] or 
imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or 
impede, the due administration of justice." Indeed, if 
"corruptly" were not so construed in S 1503, the statute 
would have no element of mens rea. In S 1512(b), however, 
both "knowing" conduct and some specific intent, described 
in subsections (1) through (3),6 are expressly required. 
Thus, because the "improper purposes" that justify the 
application of S 1512(b) are already expressly described in 
the statute, construing "corruptly" to mean merely "for an 
improper purpose" (including those described in the 
statute) renders the term surplusage, a result that we have 
been admonished to avoid. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Subsections (1) and (2) of S 1512(b) prohibit intimidating, corruptly 
persuading, or engaging in misleading conduct toward any person with 
the intent to (1) influence, delay, or prevent testimony in an official 
proceeding or (2) cause any person to withhold testimony, destroy or 
mutilate evidence, evade legal process summoning testimony or evidence, 
or be absent from an official proceeding to which the person has been 
summoned by legal process. 
 
7. For similar reasons, we also do not, as urged by Farrell, look to cases 
interpreting "corruptly" in 28 U.S.C. S 7212 to guide our interpretation 
of 
the term in S 1512(b). Section 7212 provides: 
 




Accordingly, the cases interpreting "corruptly" in S 1503 do 
not compel us to alter our conclusion that Farrell's attempt 
to persuade his coconspirator not to reveal information 





The government suggests that even if we conclude that 
an attempt to persuade a coconspirator not to reveal 
information about the conspiracy to federal law 
enforcement officials is not proscribed by the "corruptly 
persuades" clause of S 1512(b), we should still affirm 
Farrell's conviction on the ground that the evidence of 
record indicates that Farrell violated S 1512(b)(3) by 
attempting to persuade Bachetti to lie to USDA 
investigators about what Farrell was doing when he was 
captured on the USDA investigators' videotape. We decline 
to accept the government's suggestion. 
 
The indictment alleged that Farrell "did knowingly and 
unlawfully use intimidation and did attempt corruptly to 
persuade Louis Bachetti to withhold information from or 
provide false information to agents of the Department of 
Agriculture with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the 
communication by Louis Bachetti to a United States law 
enforcement officer of information relating to the 
commission of a Federal offense, that is, the sale and 
distribution of adulterated meat." App. at 13. Thus, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any 
       threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or 
       impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an 
       official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly 
or by 
       force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or 
       communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or 
       impede, the due administration of this title, shall[be punished]. 
 
As in S 1503, the term "corruptly" provides the intent element of S 7212. 
Although some cases have interpreted S 7212's intent element more 
narrowly than S 1503's, see, e.g., United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995 
(5th Cir. 1985), we do not rely on those cases because they interpret the 
term "corruptly" in a different statutory context than S 1512(b). 
 
                                11 
 
  
indictment presented four theories of Farrell's alleged 
violation of S 1512(b)(3): (1) intimidation to withhold 
information; (2) intimidation to provide false information; 
(3) corrupt persuasion to withhold information; and (4) 
corrupt persuasion to provide false information. The district 
court expressly found that Farrell "did not knowingly use 
intimidation in regard to the communication by Louis 
Bachetti," thus rejecting the first two theories. Bench Trial 
Memo. at 1 (emphasis added). The court found that Farrell 
did attempt corruptly to persuade Bachetti to "withhold 
information" from USDA investigators, but it made no 
finding on the fourth theory, i.e., whether Farrell attempted 
corruptly to persuade Bachetti to provide false information 
to USDA investigators. 
 
Despite the district court's failure to make a finding on 
the "persuasion to lie" theory, the government argues that 
we should affirm Farrell's conviction on the basis of that 
theory because there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
support it. We decline, however, to affirm Farrell's 
conviction on the basis of a theory that the judge in the 
bench trial did not resolve one way or the other. Although 
it is proper for an appellate court to imply findings of fact 
that support a general finding of guilt in a non-jury trial 
where the evidence so warrants and the defendant has not 
requested special findings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(c), see, 
e.g., United States v. Powell, 973 F.2d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Musser, 873 F.2d 1513, 1519 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989), we have found no case suggesting that we can 
imply findings of fact relevant to a theory not addressed by 
the trial court, but irrelevant to the theory on which it 
predicated its ultimate finding of guilt. Cf. McCormick v. 
United States, 500 U.S. 257, 270 n.8 (1991) ("Appellate 
courts are not permitted to affirm convictions on any theory 
they please simply because the facts necessary to support 
the theory have been presented to the jury."); Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980) ("[W]e cannot 
affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory not 
presented to the jury."). Although McCormick and Chiarella 
were tried to juries and the rationale underlying them was 
the defendant's constitutional right to have a jury decide 
his guilt in the first instance, we find them persuasive here. 
Farrell had a right, akin to the right to a jury determination 
 




of guilt, to have factfinding underlying his conviction 
performed by the court that heard all the testimony and 
saw all the evidence relevant to his case in thefirst 
instance. Accordingly, we will not independently review the 
record before us and attempt to assess the evidence 
relevant to an alternative theory, not passed upon by the 
court below, upon which to uphold a conviction that we 
have found to be erroneous on the theory put forth by the 
district court. 
 
We agree with the government, however, that there is 
evidence in the record which, if credited, would support its 
alternative theory. In these circumstances, we conclude 
that the appropriate course is to reverse the judgment of 
conviction and remand to provide an opportunity for the 
district judge who tried this case to review the existing 
record and make additional findings of fact. Cf. United 
States v. Livingston, 459 F.2d 797, 798 (3d Cir. 1972)(en 
banc)(remanding for findings of fact by district judge who 
had conducted a bench trial in a criminal case). If the court 
finds that Farrell attempted to persuade Bachetti to lie to 
the USDA investigators, it may reinstate the verdict of 
guilty on count three. If it finds to the contrary, it should 
enter a not guilty verdict on that count and resentence on 
the remaining counts. If, for any reason, the district judge 
is unable at this point to make a factual finding on this 
issue, the court should enter a not guilty verdict on count 




We will reverse Farrell's conviction for tampering with a 
witness and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 




CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge (Dissenting). 
 
As I believe that Farrell attempted "corruptly to persuade" 
his co-conspirator, Bachetti, to withhold incriminating 
information from law enforcement authorities, I would 
affirm his conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 1512(b)(3) for 
witness-tampering. Both the legislative history ofS 1512 
and the relevant case law support the government's 
position that S 1512's "corruptly persuade" language means 
the same as the similar "corruptly" language in S 1503, a 
related statute, namely, persuasion that is motivated by an 
improper purpose. I do not agree with the majority that 
applying the "improper purpose" test to S 1512 leads to 
statutory redundancy. Nor do I agree that simply because 
Bachetti would have had a Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent, Farrell's attempt to persuade him to remain 
silent, in order to shelter Farrell, was proper. I, therefore, 
respectfully dissent. 
 
1. History and Construction of Section 1512  
 
Section 1512 was enacted in 1982 to replace and expand 
witness protection provisions that had earlier been 
incorporated in 18 U.S.C. S 1503, the obstruction of justice 
statute. While S 1512 took over the area of witness 
protection, S 1503 continued to protect jurors and court 
officers against intimidation and corrupt influence, as well 
as to punish other obstructions of justice. Thus S 1503 
punished, and continues to punish, anyone who "corruptly 
. . . endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any . . . 
juror, or [federal court] officer" or otherwise "corruptly" to 
influence or obstruct the administration of justice. 
 
Section 1512's "corrupt persuasion" language, the 
language here in issue, was inserted by Congress in 1988. 
The amendment appeared in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988 (ADAA), Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181. Senator 
Biden, the ranking minority member of the Judiciary 
Committee and the Senator who had taken the lead in 
drafting the criminal provisions of the ADAA, stated that 
the intention of the 1988 Amendments was "merely to 
include in section 1512 the same protection of witnesses 
from non-coercive influence that was (and is) found in 
section 1503." 124 CONG. REC. S17300 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 
 




1988) (statement of Senator Biden). At this time, Congress 
would have been aware of the judicial precedent that had 
developed around the "corruptly" language inS 1503. 
Senator Biden and his legislative colleagues would have 
known that courts, in construing S 1503, had defined 
"corruptly" as meaning "motivated by an improper 
purpose." See e.g., United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 
990-91 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 
939, 941 (2d Cir. 1978); Martin v. United States, 166 F.2d 
76, 79 (4th Cir. 1948) (approving a jury instruction that 
defined "corruptly" as "with an improper motive"). 
 
Given this background, it is logical to attribute to the 
"corruptly persuade" language in S 1512, as adopted by 
Congress in 1988, the same well-established meaning 
already attributed by the courts to the comparable 
language in S 1503, i.e. "motivated by an improper 
purpose." This is what was concluded by the Second 
Circuit, the only court of appeals to have so far interpreted 
this aspect of S 1512. The Second Circuit translated the 
"improper purpose" standard from S 1503 to S 1512. United 
States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1996). The 
Second Circuit's interpretation fits well within Senator 
Biden's statement, since it includes within S 1512 
protection from non-coercive conduct analogous to that 
embraced within S 1503. 
 
I cannot agree, therefore, with the majority's assertion 
that the legislative history does not provide "much 
assistance" in construing the "corruptly persuade" language 
in issue. Senator Biden's statement coupled with the fact 
that the witness-tampering provision of S 1512 evolved from 
S 1503, is strong evidence that Congress intended 
"corruptly persuade" in S 1512 to be construed in much the 
same manner as courts have construed similar phraseology 
in S 1503. 
 
2. Adopting the "Improper Purpose" Test for Section 1512 
       does not Lead to Statutory Redundancy 
 
The majority declines to follow the Second Circuit in 
Thompson because of its view that the disparate structures 
of the two statutes make such translation inappropriate. 
They state that the term "corruptly" provides the only intent 
 




element of S 1503, whereas S 1512 contains explicit general 
and specific intent elements in addition to the term 
"corruptly." According to the majority, "construing 
`corruptly' to mean merely `for an improper purpose' 
(including those described in the statute) renders the term 
surplusage." Majority Op., at p. 10, citing Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994). 
 
However, interpreting "corruptly" to mean "motivated by 
an improper purpose" does not create statutory 
redundancy. It is true that many courts have loosely 
declared that the term "corruptly" in S 1503 "does not 
superimpose a special and additional element on the 
offense," United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 239 (10th Cir. 
1979), but rather includes any act "done with the purpose 
of obstructing justice," United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 
843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981). But such broad statements 
overlook that not all actions taken with the intent to hinder 
or obstruct justice necessarily violate S 1503 or S 1512. In 
such instances, the term "corruptly" can play an important 
role in limiting the reach of the statutes. For example, a 
mother urging her son, in his own interest, to claim his 
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent would hardly be 
acting "corruptly," that is, with an improper purpose. A 
newspaper attacking a particular prosecutor as going too 
far, or an altruistic citizen writing a letter to the prosecutor 
or the judge seeking clemency for the accused -- would be 
other examples where the corruption requirement, i.e., 
improper purpose, would limit prosecutions under both 
statutes. 
 
In United State v. Thompson, the court of appeals rejected 
the argument that by criminalizing corrupt persuasion, 
S 1512 violated Thompson's free speech rights. The court 
held that "[a] prohibition against corrupt acts `is clearly 
limited to . . . constitutionally unprotected and purportedly 
illicit activity.' " Thompson, 76 F.3d at 452 (quoting United 
States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(construing 18 U.S.C. S 1503 (1982)). See United States v. 
Fasolino, 449 F. Supp. 586 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 586 F.2d 939 
(2d Cir. 1978) (non-corrupt endeavors to influence a jurist 
do not violate S 1503). Because S 1512 does not prevent 
innocent conduct nor "lawful or constitutionally protected 
 




speech," id., even if such conduct or speech has the effect 
of hindering an investigation, the term "corruptly" adds an 
important dimension to S 1512. 
 
I, therefore, disagree with the majority's contention that 
to construe "corruptly" as meaning "with an improper 
purpose," simply duplicates the intent element already 
present in S 1512. "Corruptly" indicates that persuasion of 
another which is intended to hinder, delay or prevent 
communications to a law enforcement officer or judge is 
criminal only if the dimension of improper purpose can also 
be found.1 
 
3. Farrell's Purpose when he Attempted to Prevent Bachetti 
   from Communicating with Investigators was Improper  
 
The majority declares that Farrell lacked the degree of 
culpability necessary to violate S 1512. The majority 
believes that Farrell's actions were not corrupt because 
Farrell was merely urging Bachetti to avail himself of his 
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The majority 
apparently sees Farrell's own interest in Bachetti's 
constitutional privilege as outweighing the right of society 
to "the information of citizens regarding the commission of 
a crime." Majority Op., at p. 8 n.3. 
 
Bachetti could, indeed, have invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right and refused to cooperate with the 
investigation in order to protect himself. But nothing in this 
principle implies that Farrell is constitutionally entitled to 
try to persuade Bachetti to take the Fifth Amendment in 
order to protect Farrell himself. To the contrary, courts that 
have faced this issue have decided the other way,finding 
that behavior similar to Farrell's violates S 1503. For 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 1. To be sure, "improper purpose" may not always be self-defining, and 
may require further analysis in some situations. One who withholds 
evidence of tax evasion in order to avoid supporting governmental 
policies he dislikes may (incorrectly) claim to have acted properly 
because of the purported purity of his motive. A newspaper that 
challenges a criminal prosecution may, in the eyes of some, be acting 
with an improper purpose, yet may still be protected by the First 
Amendment. Nonetheless, the fact that the meaning of "improper 
purpose" is not always utterly clear does not eliminate its utility in 
helping further define and limit the thrust of the statute. 
 




example, in United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 
1974), the defendant insisted that merely advising a 
witness to plead the Fifth Amendment could not constitute 
an obstruction of justice. The Second Circuit disagreed. 
Affirming a district court jury instruction, the court found 
that "one who . . . advises with corrupt motive a witness to 
take [the Fifth Amendment], can and does obstruct or 
influence the administration of justice." Id. at 1119. The 
court added that "[t]he lawful behavior of the person 
invoking the Amendment cannot be used to protect the 
criminal behavior of the inducer." Id. 
 
Similarly, in Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 
1964), a Ninth Circuit case that interpreted the oldS 1503, 
the court noted that even an innocent act, such as claiming 
Fifth Amendment protection, "may make another a criminal 
who sees that the innocent act is accomplished for a 
corrupt purpose." Id. at 439-40. The court affirmed a jury 
finding that the defendant, who had advised several 
individuals to take the Fifth Amendment, illegally 
obstructed justice because his advice was given in order to 
benefit himself. 
 
Nor does the fact that Farrell and Bachetti were co- 
conspirators affect this analysis. The court in United States 
v. Cortese, 568 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Pa. 1983), faced a 
situation quite similar to Farrell. In Cortese, one 
coconspirator had claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination before a grand jury. After 
declaring that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a "personal 
one," the court found that liability could attach if "a co- 
conspirator can be shown by . . . corrupt motive to have 
induced his ally to invoke the [Fifth Amendment] privilege." 
Id. at 129. 
 
Farrell's purpose in the present matter was improper: he 
sought to induce Bachetti to withhold information regarding 
the commission of a crime in order to shield Farrell himself 
from an honest investigation of what had occurred. Such 
self-interested behavior constitutes corrupt persuasion 
because it is "motivated by an improper purpose," i.e. a 
purpose different from Bachetti's personal constitutional 
right to remain silent. On the facts of this case, I believe 
that the district court properly ruled that Farrell violated 
 




S 1512 by advising Bachetti to refuse to cooperate with 
investigators. I would affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
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